



## LOKĀYATA CONCEPT OF TIME IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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### ABSTRACT :

Time is very important topic in the world of philosophy, as well as in our daily life. This paper has tried to give an account of the Lokāyata concept of time. To explain this, it is discussed at first about the various pictures of time, depending on various belief of time. Then it is discussed here regarding the Lokāyata rejection of prevailing social condition, and as a result the Lokāyata acceptance of linear time, denying the notion of cyclic time. To establish the notion of linear time, it is analysed by the Lokāyata about their acceptance of mere perception and denial of inference as source of valid knowledge. In this context, this article has explained shortly about Jayarāṣī's *Tattvapaplavasiṃha* to express the Lokāyata method of philosophical thinking. Also to understand clearly the Lokāyata notion of time, the controversy of Lokāyata school with others schools of Indian Philosophy (as Bouddha, Jaina, Nyāya, Advaita Vedānta, and Sāṃkhya) has been discussed shortly in this article. Finally it is concluded that the Lokāyata rejection of quasi-cyclic time does not mean an acceptance of linear time of industrial capitalism, but it means the acceptance of linear mundane time.



**KEYWORDS :** Lokāyata, Cyclic Time, Linear Time, Perception, Inference, Mundane Time.

### INTRODUCTION:

Among various problems, the nature of time is one of the grave problems in the world of philosophy. The time has been analysed by all sects of philosophy of India and all other countries as well. Here, we shall discuss about the Indian, especially the Lokāyata concept of time.

Depending on various time faiths, there are several depictions of time in Indian heritage. As cyclic or linear, the time has been depicted. The Christian opinion is marked by the linear time. The Christian thought introduces liberty and development. Necessitarianism, static societies, etc. are introduced by the cyclic time. Generally in *Purānas*, the time is cyclic in essence. In a cyclic process one *Kalpa* is pursued by later *Kalpa*. Human life has been likened by *Katha Upaniṣad* to the cycle of crops to seed, and then seeds to crop. By life after death, the soul is connected with the time. In a simple verbal sense, there is life after death, because time is quasi-cyclic. Moreover, for the Faith in life after death, the idea of cause bears to the characteristics of time. The actions of the former life ascertained the dispositions (*saṃskāra*) in the present life - it was the belief in Indian wisdom.

But the restrictive state of society was refuted by the Lokāyata. This rejection also refuted the restrictive social conception of quasi-cyclic time, that was supported by the faith of quasi-cyclic time. This

refutation means the refutation of logic or inference as a source of valid knowledge. They only accepted that valid thing, which was manifested. That's why, they exploded any causal resolution of the kind, where actions in one cycle could outcome in layout in the subsequent.

A psychic truth separate from the corporeal thing in the world - this truth was strongly protested by the *Lokāyata*. Because of regeneration and transmigration it is said that the origin of orthodox Indian Philosophy is attached in reflection about this psychic base go bound the universe of matter. To the notion of karma this allowance of reincarnation is tagged. Without the goodness or badness of the actions which are accomplished, the quality and acuity of karmic chain is not possible. Karmic retaliation always tagged to the notion of rebirth and transmigration. This is the perfect doctrine of the karmic retaliation.

In epistemology *Lokāyatas* are known as positivists. As a source of valid knowledge the only accept *pratyakṣa* or perception and deny all other means of valid knowledge or *pramāna*. The *Lokāyata* philosophy is associated with materialism, because as a means of knowledge they only accepted perception, and for them this material world can only be known by perception. According to *Nyāyamañjari*, the *Lokāyata* school occupy perception or *pratyakṣa* as the only *pramāna* or means of valid knowledge. Since, for *Lokāyata* Perception is sole source of knowledge, then we should explore the term "*Pratyakṣa*". The term *Pratyakṣa* has derived etymologically from two terms - '*Prati*' and '*Akṣa*'. '*Prati*' means 'before' or 'near' and the term '*Akṣa*' means 'the eye'. The eye or *Akṣa* is the delegate of the sense organs. So the term '*Pratyakṣa*' stays for anything coming in contact with a sense organ.

As a means of knowledge now we shall discuss the *Lokāyata* viewpoint on inference or *anumāna*. According to some laws, which condition the truthful of inferential knowledge, an operation of inference involves a method. Depending on inference the *Lokāyata* school became the strongest antagonist of the *Nyāya* school of Indian philosophy. The insistence of *anumāna* provided by the *Nyāya* is as follows : The hill has fire, because the hill has smoke. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g. a kitchen. From the appearance of smoke in the hill the entity of fire is supposed here. The acceptance of unchanging concomitance between smoke and fire is the ground of this supposition. The attendance of fire is guessed from the smoke. In this instance the smoke is called as *hetu*, *sādhana* or lungs. This term is used by the *Nyāya* to denote the cause or *hetu*. *Nyāya* says that, here fire is *sādhya*, because it is deduced with the help of *hetu*. The locus of *sādhya* is known as *pakṣa*. The term invariability or *avinabhāva* is called by the fixed connection between *sādhanā* and *sādhya*. *Vyāpti* is more exoteric term of it.

*Vyāptijñāna* means the knowledge of an invariable concomitance between *sādhanā* and *sādhya*. On *vyāpti* the validity of inference depends. *Vyāpti* performs a very important role in the act of inference. *Vyāpti* is the very basis of *anumāna* or inference. If we do not perceive the *sādhanā* and *sādhya* continuously and concurrently in different instances, then the knowledge of *vyāpti* or *vyāptijñāna* is not possible.

Although, *vyāpti* is very essential for the inferential knowledge, but the *Lokāyata* has raised the question about the validity of *vyāpti* in their refusal of *anumāna*. As a source of valid knowledge, all the no-*Lokāyata* schools of philosophy in India accept inference or *anumāna*, but the *Lokāyata* give various cause for their critique of *anumāna* or inference. They argue against *āptavākya* or about the word of authority. The *āptavākya* plays a very important role in propagation of the knowledge of *vyāpti* or *vyāptijñāna*. If there is justified belief in a constant relation between a word and it's meaning, or in other words, a confidence concerning the presence of another *vyāptijñāna*, then this reliability is possible. As a result, the fallacy of *Petitia Principi* is occurred in the procedure. So, as the basis of inference the *Lokāyata* denies authority.

In the propagation of *vyāptijñāna* the *Lokāyata* invade the ability of perception. According to them, any knowledge of an unchanging connection between two objects or events via perception can be acquired only through an watching of all the examples of these objects or events. But it is not probable for outer sense organ in leading such an all comprehensive observation, that is essential for reaching at the general notion of *vyāpti* only by perception. According to *Lokāyata*, even if we notice the presence of *sādhanā* and *sādhya* in countless instances, we can not hope it to be stable, for there is no surety that the co-existence seen in the past will hold in the future also. The *Lokāyatas* also says that, although the observation of each

example of co-existence between the *sādhana* and *sādhyā* is probable, nevertheless we can not say that, it is sufficient for a proper notion of *vyāpti*. Therefore, the inference can not be a valid source of knowledge.

As an applied issues the *Lokāyata* rejection of inference is accepted, but not as a theoretical issues. They attempted few for applied discretion of wisdom. Maintaining perception or *pratyakṣa* as the main and sole source of knowledge and bordering on a materialistic appearance on life and subsistence - these are affair of philosophical mock. *Samśāra* accepts the inference or *anumāna* on practical discretions. He does not consent it as a valid means of knowledge or *pramāna*. For him, inferential knowledge is indefinite and uncertain. So it does not conduct to an ideal form of knowledge. But if we certainly hope in inference, then the applied aptness of inferential knowledge would be spoiled.

The applied aptness of *anumāna* and *āptavākya* are seemed in *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. It says that, it is not possible to involve in deeds of our everyday life, only through accepting the perception. *Udayana* points out in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* that, we can not deny to presume beyond perceptual region, otherwise the hurdles probably to be obstructed by us in our daily life. In proclaiming the favourable impact of *āptavākya* and *anumāna*, *Jayanta Bhāṭṭa* also criticised the *Lokāyata*.

Indispensable characteristic of *Lokāyata* is that, they are *nāstika*. With the help of argument of inference they have refused inference itself. It is called civil strife. *Udyatkara* is a supporter of inference. According to him, except inference it is not possible to assert the usefulness of inference itself. For *Lokāyata*, perceptual knowledge is straight and not mediated. But the fault of this opinion has been exhibited by *Mīmāṃsā* school. According to *Mīmāṃsā* school no cognition is unmediated. So only through contact of sense organs with object, the knowledge of that object is not possible.

All information of *Lokāyata* methods of thought are recorded in *Jayarāśi's Tattvapaplavasimha* (TPS). So this book infiltrates an important position in Indian philosophy. In 1937 this book risen first time in a revealed form. From the traditionally adopted *Cārvāka* viewpoint peculiarly adequate *Jayarāśi's* doctrines in TPS marks a great outgoing. In the TPS the *Lokāyatas* are look as nihilist sceptics. They are also look as materialism attached with the universe of perception. The *Lokāyatas* refuse the existence of soul, transmigration etc. So they denounce the inference as a means of valid knowledge. Even, we can see in TPS that, from the sphere of valid proof the *Lokāyatas* are throwing away the perception or *pratyakṣa*. So we can say that, the *Lokāyatas* were impressed as systematic reconstructionist in the TPS.

To a mutiny in opposition to the *Vedic* creed and *Vedic* ceremonial culture the *Lokāyata* school owes it's primordial. Now we shall discuss in short regarding the TPS refusal of the *Vedas*. According to the authority upholding philosophers, the assertion, formed by the *āpta* are permanently indisputable and true. This view has been criticised by *Jayarāśi*. He says that, the perception can not give the cognition about the authority of an individual. The inference also can not give clue in all cases. The subsistence of the *āpta* may recognized, but except exact perscrutation, no one should attribute validity in the shape of proof to the words of the *āpta*. It is said that, the *Vedas* are not created by human authors, but it dispatch it's perpetual truth to human from generation to generation. In this context *Jayarāśi* says, the true word is that, human beings have written the *Vedas*, but people are failed to keep in mind the real thing. The conclusion of the TPS is that, no one can recollect the statement of the start of an event.

*Jayarāśi* is in harmony with the *Lokāyata* in all his above reasons and contrary reasons. To remove the veil of desolation from the *Vedic* actions, the *Lokāyatas* use only argument. *Vedic* activities are covered with the curtain of supernaturalism. These activities are accepted to be axiomatic requiring neither logic, nor any practical evidences for their existence. To ask their personal supposition and fine-tune their reasons, the Indian philosophical systems were accused by *Jayarāśi's* radical scepticism, radical empiricism and systematic deconstruction. It was also done by the questioning mind of the *Lokāyatas*.

Now we shall discuss about a prevalent characteristic in the *Lokāyata* methods of thinking. They do not accept consciousness as a distinct entity, that is separate from the corporeal physique. For the *Lokāyata* school, perception is the sole source of valid knowledge. This view has departed the *Lokāyata* far away from the common tendency of Indian philosophical tradition. The Indian tradition holds that, our selfhood is actualized by the sense of "I". For Indian heritage, that which implies something surpassing the corporeal

physique, is nothing but "I", a conscious sentiment. According to the philosophers, this something is necessarily a spirit, substance-soul. It is completely distinct from the physique. For them, it is indestructible extract of the individual, and it is called the self. It is said that, this self is personalised exposition of the absolute self. The individual self or *jīva* wants to finish its karmic surpluses from preceding lives. For this, the individual self accepts its birth on earth by connecting itself with a certain physique. *Samsara* means the cycle of birth and death. The law of karma controls the cycle of *samsāra*. In the *Lokāyata* process of thinking, this notion of self does not get any position. In *Lokāyata* school, death is meant as a complete termination of a person's existence. But it does not mean a sheer dissolution from the corporeal physique. The *Lokāyata* regards that, the self is nothing, but the physique, built of the material components, which are available by perception. According to this theory, the corporeal physique is indicated by the self-consciousness or "I". It can be described by us that, statements as "I am short", "I am sick" etc. are the true meaning of "I". In these statements several features of the physique and their works are imposed to meaningful, denominated by "I". All these self-references will be formed insignificant and not be connected with each other and disjointed, if the self is not imposed a spatial position. But when we say like "my hand", "my leg" etc., then "I" means something isolated and strikes something detached from the physique. These phrases are deliberated as rhetorical to the *Lokāyatas*. Only a metaphorical sense is carried by "I", in these instances.

we have to mind it that, the *Lokāyata* doctrine is very nuanced. This view is intellectually challenging, and it is accurately empiricist and also it is separated from creed. When the Indian philosophers want to give answer to the *Lokāyata* view, they always count an authority and tradition. A deficiency of exact realisation of the innovative characteristic of the *Lokāyata* position is displayed by these authority and heritage. According to *Lokāyata*, the self is not a distinct psychic essence, which subsist the physique. A psychic substance can never interpret the individual identity. A psychic substance can not be verified to subsist. But all the several form of personality, that an individual moults, will realize the individual identity. The expositions of sensation, the functioning of the physique - all these comprised in above mentioned forms. A cluster notion means the notion of a person. The *Lokāyata* engages the concept of self to receive the intricate package. The self has abode in an interactive neighbouring, and It has incarnation, and also it has spatial position. The body has an intricate and nuanced role in an interactive neighbouring. According to *Lokāyata*, one can not individuate the self, if the body does not play the main role in the construal of individual identity.

Mainly the Indian Philosophy decided into two branches - one is orthodox *Vedic* philosophy, and the second one is heterodox *Bouddha* philosophy. According to *Vedic* philosophy, the self is a stable entity, independent of the physique. On the other hand, according to *Bouddha* philosophy, the self is not a physical expertise, but a continuous flow of consciousness. Sensation is successive propagation of transient drops, it is not a single whole. Although they maintain the theory of karma and transmigration. *Śāntarākṣita* and *Kamalaśīla* have written *Tattvasamgraha* and *Tattvasamgraha-Pañjikā* gradually. In these books the accounts of *Lokāyata* encounter with *Buddhist* philosophers have been recorded. The *Lokāyata* angles of visions on significant context have been filed by these two *Buddhist* philosophers. According to *Lokāyata*, the sensation rises from the senseless inert physique. To explain this, the *Lokāyatas* have taken the help of analogies. The *Sāṃkhya* teacher *Vijñānabhikṣu*, and *Jayanta Bhaṭṭa* have analyzed and denounced these analogies or similarities. Moreover, according to the *Lokāyatas*, the corporeal components are normally unconscious, but when exhibited as physiques of alive entity, then turn conscious.

Now, we shall discuss regarding a question - is there any causal connection between corporeal physique and sensation? In this behalf the causality has been refused by the non-*Lokāyata* philosophers. In opposition to the *Lokāyatas*, the argument is that, the same type of thing will be produced by the causal system. So, if the sensation does not present in material cause, then the attendance of sensation in physical body, is incomprehensible. Similarly, for *Buddhist* thinker *Kamalaśīla*, if there does not subsist something to illustrate an affinity between two qualities, then a causal connection between them is not possible. For this, there is no connection between fire and coolness. Likewise, *Kamalaśīla* holds that, without an assured example, which favouring a causal relation, the notion of such a relation between sensation and corporeal



physique appears unimaginable. *Kamalaśīla* also says that, a conclusion concerning the causal relation depends on both the process of *anvaya* and *vyātireka*, or agreement and disagreement. This process means that, in the outturn of the effect in question, the cause whose definite subsistence is mechanical, can be determined by us. So, in the determination of a causal connection between sensation and corporeal physique, the implementation is impossible.

There is a brief sketch about *Śāṅkara's* refutation of the *Lokāyata* opinion regarding the connection between sensation and corporeal physique. As *purbapakṣa*, the *Lokāyata* argument is - when an object is present then the quality of that object is visible, but the quality is invisible when that object is not present. So we can say that, "heat" and "luster" are the qualities of fire. For, they are non-existent when fire is absent, and they exist only when fire exists. The properties of self are endeavour, life, memory, sensation etc. The corporeal physique is the basis of these features of self. In absence of corporeal physique, these properties are also absent. So these are necessarily the quality of corporeal physique. According to *Lokāyata*, an object is a quality of that object, with which it has unchanging concomitance. This argument of *Lokāyata* is analyzed by *Śāṅkara*. According to him, with corporeal qualities the classification of sensation is not possible. As a cause, *Śāṅkara* says that, by any other ingredient, the replacement of consciousness is impossible. Without the concomitance of sensation with the physique, the sensation could not be a quality of the corporeal physique. That means, it is impossible for sensation to be a quality of corporeal physique. So, senseless physique is the reality.

The main cause of controversy between all orthodox schools of Indian philosophy and all the branches of *Lokāyata* schools depend on the question of stability of the self. There is a necessary connection between the notion of reborn of the soul with a new physique, and the concept of the stability of the soul. The *Lokāyata* view of the fatality of sensation exposed with the physique, and the notion of transmigration of self - these two ideas are not consistent with each other.

In context of the notion of transmigration, the *Lokāyatas* have criticised the *Buddhists* also. In *Śāntarākṣita* and in *Kamalaśīla*, we can get the discussion about this criticism. The concept of stable self is also replaced in Buddhism, by their concept of gradual stream of consciousness. Any component of body, mind or sense organs do not produce this stream. Every separate consciousness in the chain, owes its source to the one instantly preceding it, which again is caused by another of the same kind. In this way, the first incident of sensation in a new born must also be due to a cause, because every conscious jiff can only be caused by another. If we want to know the cause of this, then we can get the ground for the *Buddhist* faith in transmigration, which conjoins the sensation in a new born baby to the ultimate streak of sensation in the previous birth. Thus the *Buddhist* theory wants to propagate the self-identity through the continuation of birth and death. This theory does not want to keep down it to a single life span.

According to the *Lokāyatas*, the physique is the mere substratum of sensation. For *Lokāyatas*, with the connection of previous, the subsequent perishing fully. They do not justify the *Buddhist* adoption regarding the concept of a connection between the appearance of sensation in this life and in some preceding one, because they do not get anything in it. That means, the *Lokāyata* school do not think that the sensation of an individual prior to death is the cause of its recapitulation in a new birth. According to them, it is impossible to present in various times, of the same person, in various physiques. They do not accept that, as a single chain, the sensation can belong to different physiques. According to them, holding respective bodies, the association of the mind of an elephant with that of a horse or of a bear with that of a buffalo, is not possible. It may also be mentioned similarly that, in two following lifetimes, two separate physiques holding different places.

*Nyāya* philosopher *Udayana* criticised the *Lokāyata*, by saying that, they have accepted only perception as a means of valid knowledge, and this acceptance would make practical life impossible. Perhaps, to protect the *Lokāyata* position, the refusal of inference by the *Lokāyata* was proposed at particular key inference. With the help of such inferences the *Lokāyatas* warned people in opposition to religious absorption. To counter crafty cheater, the *Lokāyatas* insisted on the manifestation. By saying about next world, these crafty cheaters finagled people. Peoples were also cognized by them that the manifestly

bad was finally good. Relying upon inference and accusing testimony, the above cheaters installed their notions. To religion and any other exploitative systems, the *Lokāyata* process of refutation of cheating was applied. The *Lokāyatas* were complained by *Udayana*, because they accepted a deceptive mode of controversy in receiving the inferences, which needed for practical life. Although, on the other hand these were refused by them. The *Lokāyatas* were described as science of cavil and disputation, *vitandā* and *vāda*, by a Buddhist commentator *Buddhaghosa*. The *Naiyāyikas* and the Buddhists were consentient on opposition to *Lokayata*. But from *Purandara*, a 7th century writer in the *Lokāyata* heritage, the *Jaina* explainer, *Vadideva Sūri* quotes a verse, while consenting that, to keep down inference to practical life and to refuse it in the transcendental sphere, was the intention of exalting sense-perception. Depending on inference, with the talk of other worlds, the religious absorption was occurring in our society. The *Lokāyata* process of defence in opposition to religious absorption was to deny inference and to perceive object in this world. The capitalist exploitation through talk of future advantage may also be stopped by this materialistic system of *Lokāyata* school.

### CONCLUSION :

In this way the *Lokāyata* refused the notion of cyclic time. Although, the *Lokāyata* refused the cyclic time, but they did not accepted the linear time of industrial capitalism. Without a clear difference between linear mundane time and the linear superlinear time of industrial capitalism, it would be inconceivable to us. The *Lokāyata* metamorphosis of time was linked with a three-fold metamorphosis in (i) Logic, valid reasoning or methods of proof; (ii) Social organisation, and (iii) Values and the way of life. By refusing quasi cyclic time the *Lokāyatas* denied the linear superlinear time of industrial capitalism, or the linear apocalyptic time, or Christianity, but they adopted the mundane time. Both the theory of deferred consumption and the theory of sin were refused by the *Lokāyata*. As the basis of morality the notion of injustice also refused by the *Lokāyata*.

Although the *Lokāyatas* had striking prominent, like a adoption of justice, but in fine they drowned. Because, most probably, being benefited from injustice the elite class of society fully refused the justice. Since, along with the offering of a radical variation of values, the *Lokāyatas* also offered a discontinuous variation in logic and facts - like quasi-cyclic time. As a result, the very basis of values was ruined by the refusal of quasi-cyclic time, as the basis of values.

Generally, it is true that, the *Lokāyata* became detrimental to ethics and religion, and also became illogical. For this, the *Lokāyata* school propelled. But it is not true in opposite. We should not entitle it as unethical materialism, rather we should entitle it as naturalism and humanism. We have to mind it that, the *Lokāyata* philosophy did not introduce their discussion as a sheer intellectual interest or exclusively with the sake of discrowning the Vedic way of life. The *Lokāyata* philosophy introduced their discussion as a philosophy of life, which explained, What is man?, What is his aim in life ?, How can he accomplish it ? At that time, all metaphysics were intended to elaborate a way of life, as an intellectually enunciated religion. The intention of the *Lokāyata* metaphysics was, to be a way of life and for a way of life.

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