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THE EPISTEMIC DISCOURSE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES-SVATHAH AND PARATAPHPRAMANAYAVADA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MIMANSA AND NYAYA PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT:

The theory or intrinsic validity and extrinsic validity of knowledge is also known as Svatahp and pararahmanayavada are important aspects of explaining the truth or falsity or knowledge and to ascertain how a piece of knowledge is constituted and ascertained. In this regard the Nyaya and Mimamsa philosophy is the background to explain those things. Nyaya advocates neither validity nor invalidity is self-evident, but that both are due to external conditions. On the other hand old knowledge has self evident validity, while falsity is due to external condition as advocated by Mimamsa. Trough this study an attempt is made to reveal new outlook on Svatahpramyanyavada and paratahpramanyavada of Nyaya and mimamsa Philosophy.



KEYWORDS: *intrinsic validity and extrinsic validity, external conditions.*

INTRODUCTION

Nyaya and Mimamsa are the most system. Gautam or aksapada was the important philosophy are the most founder Nyaya Philosophy and Jaimini important philosophy of India orthodox is the founder of Mimamsa philosophy. Nyaya means argumentation and suggests that the system is predominantly intellectual, analytical, logical and epistemological. It is also called Tarkashastra or the science of Reasoning. Otherwise Mimamsa literally means "revered thought" and

was originally applied to the interpretation of the Vedic rituals which commanded highest reverence.

According to Nyaya philosophy, knowledge has two distinctions-valid (parama) and invalid (aparama). Valid knowledge is definite knowledge or real knowledge and it consists in knowing the object as it is. It has four distinctive sources viz, perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Knowledge arising from sources other than these is called invalid or aprama.

On the other hand, the Mimamsa holds that all knowledge is intrinsically valid and its invalidity

is due to extraneous conditions. The Advaita Vedanta also holds this view. The Mimamsa holds that all knowledge is valid in itself. The validity of knowledge consists in its apprehending an object. This knowledge will be invalid if it is in disagreement with the real nature of its object. The validity of knowledge is intrinsic. It is set aside by a contradicting knowledge and the knowledge of any defect in the causes of knowledge. Validity of knowledge is not nown by any subsequent knowledge of fruitful activity or the absence of contradicting knowledge.

Svatah and Paratahpramanyavada of Mimamsa and Nyaya Philosophy

Epistemology means the theory of knowledge. Mimamsa system upholds the theory of svatahpramanyavada. By this theory, they mean the theory of self validity or intrinsic validity of knowledge. They say that all apprehension is regarded as intrinsically valid. All knowledge is regarded as valid by itself only. It is not validated by any other knowledge. They say that the validity of knowledge arises from the essential nature of the causes of knowledge. Prabhakara and Kumarila both uphold the intrinsic validity of knowledge and criticized the Nyaya's view of validity of knowledge.

It is the very nature of knowledge to reveal its object. It, therefore, follows that knowledge requires no other conditions that itself to reveal its object. It cannot be said that knowledge is neutral cognition and that validity and invalidity are its adventitious characters. Similarly, the validity of knowledge must be known from the conditions of knowledge itself. A true knowledge is by itself known to be true. Hence, knowledge must certify its own truth. The validity of knowledge is self evident. This view of the Mimamsa is known as the theory of intrinsic validity or self validity of knowledge (Svatapramanyavada)

In this regard Prabhakara says, "All cognitions as cognitions are valid, their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects." Kumarila also says, "The validity of knowledge consists in its apprehending an object, it is set aside by such discrepancies as its disagreement with the real nature of the object." Both say that all knowledge is presumably valid and its invalidity is inferred either from some defects in the instrument of knowledge or from a subsequent contradicting knowledge.

On the other hand, Nyaya Philosophy advocates the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge, which is known as Paratahpramanyavada. According to it, knowledge is regarded as neither valid nor invalid in itself. It is regarded as neutral. It has been said that the question of its validity or invalidity arises only after knowledge has arisen. Nyaya system says that the nature of knowledge is regarded as its correspondence with its objects and the test of truth is regarded as a fruitful activity. So he says that if knowledge leads to fruitful activity, then it is valid and if it does not, then it is invalid. It has been said that validity and invalidity are not intrinsically connected with knowledge.

The Mimamsa system agrees with the Nyayikas so far as the invalidity of knowledge is concerned, because both regard it as due to extraneous conditions. But Mimamsa criticize the Nyayikas in regard to the validity of knowledge. All knowledge is intrinsic valid according to Mimamsa system. It says that if the validity of knowledge like its invalidity depends on extraneous conditions the no knowledge would ever become valid. He says that the Nyayikas says that knowledge arises simply as knowledge because it is neutral and the question of its validity as invalidity arises afterward and also depends on external test only, but the Mimamsa says that so called neutral knowledge is regarded as an impossibility. It says that we always experience either valid or invalid knowledge, so there is no third alternative which is needed. So we never can experience neutral knowledge.

Mimamsa system says that the invalidity is due to extraneous condition but the validity cannot be due to any extraneous condition. Nothing can validate knowledge if knowledge is regarded as not self valid. It has been said that presence of any excellence in the causes of knowledge cannot make it valid. It says that if the validity of knowledge is due to an external it valid. It says that if the validity of knowledge is due to an external condition, then this second knowledge of excellence would require a third knowledge to validate itself, before it can validate the first knowledge and so on it goes to act infinitum. He says the fallacy of infinite regress cannot be avoided since, the knowledge of the external condition, which is said to validate any knowledge. Itself knowledge and that knowledge would require another external condition to validate it.

However, the Nyayikas criticize the Mimamsa view of self-validity of knowledge by saying that if all knowledge be intrinsically valid, the distinction between truth and falsehood becomes obliterated. If all cognition be true in itself, there cannot be any wrong cognition. But wrong cognitions like illusions, hallucinations etc., are undeniable facts.

In deference of the Mimamsakas, it may however be said that many thinkers are of the opinion that one subscribes to a realistic view, one has got to accept the theory, that all knowledge is

intrinsically valid and its validity is self-evident. The Mimamsa is a system of realism and hence quite logically it upholds the view of intrinsic validity of knowledge. In this respect it is rather the Nyaya-Vaiseika system, which being a realistic system, appears to be inconsistent, since it holds that the validity of knowledge is constituted and also known by external conditions.

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