



## CĀRVĀKAS ON DOUBT OF DEVIATION: A CRITIQUE

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### ABSTRACT

The Carvaka system of Indian Philosophy cherished doubt of deviation which is called *vyabhicāraśamkā* in the relation of *vyāpti* between probans and probandum (*hetu* and *sādhya*). Normally where there is *hetu*, there is *sādhya*. This invariable relation is technical *vyāpti* or pervasion. The Cārvākas are of the view that in future there is no guarantee that a *hetu* and a *sādhya* will remain together. If a *hetu* (smoke for example) remains without a *sādhya* (fire) then it is called deviation or *vyabhicāra*. Considering such possibilities in view the Cārvākas nourish some sort of doubt of such deviation. Let us see how they substantiate their standpoint.

**KEYWORDS:** *vyāpti*, *vyabhicāra*, *tādātmya*, *tadutpatti*.

### INTRODUCTION:

In the history of Indian Philosophy the Cārvākas believe that inference cannot be taken as a source of valid cognition (*Pramā*) because the knowledge of *Vyāpti*, the uncommon cause (*karana*) of inference, cannot be known by any means and hence prediction about future is not justifiable for having some doubt about their coexistence in remote future. To them if some one gets fire from the knowledge of smoke, it is merely accidental which is technically called *yadrccchikī*, which is exemplified by the phrase *manimantrauśadhādivat*. Just as an individual being gets his desired object after holding some jewel or after chanting some *mantra* or applying some medicine, a man can get fire from the knowledge of smoke, which has no causal basis. *Vyāpti* cannot be ascertained through perception in which internal sense-organ acts as an instrument. As internal sense-organ depends on external sense-organ in knowing an external object, it cannot produce the perceptual knowledge of an object independently. The internal sense-organ has got capacity to reveal the mental situations which are going on within, but not to reveal other objects that are capable of being perceived through external sense-organs. Inference cannot provide the cognition of *vyāpti* on account of the fact that the knowledge of *vyāpti* is the precondition for applying an inference. If the knowledge of *vyāpti* depends on an inference, the inference itself also will depend on the knowledge of *vyāpti*. Thus the knowledge of *vyāpti* or inference will never be attained due to the defect of *Infinite Regress* (*anavasthā*). Verbal testimony fails to ascertain *vyāpti*, because the import (*samketa*) existing in a term known from the meaning of a particular word is understood through the auditory perception of the words. The knowledge of the import regarding a particular meaning of a particular word is attained from the conventional usage (*vṛddhavyavahāra*), which is a form of inference. Hence the above-mentioned defect i.e., *infinite regress* will again occur here.<sup>1</sup> According to some, *vyāpti* is a relation free from extraneous adjunct (*upādhi*) (*nirupādhiko sambandho vyāptih*). If it is accepted, the knowledge of the absence of extraneous adjunct is highly essential. If it is known by inference, there would occur the defect called *infinite regress* (*anavasthā*). If something has an equal pervasion with the probandum



not being pervader of the probans, it is called *upādhi* (*sādhanāvvyāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāptih*). The cognition of *upādhi* is not at all possible as it will involve the defect of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). Without the cognition of *vyāpti* the equal pervasion with the probandum (*sādhyasamavyāpti*) cannot be properly understood. The terms like ‘*vyāpya*’ and ‘*vyāpakatva*’ are relative in the sense without the proper idea of *vyāpti* these terms are unintelligible and hence without the proper knowledge of *vyāpti* the knowledge of *upādhi* is not possible. For this reason the defect of *anyonyāśraya* occurs. Depending on the foregoing arguments it is concluded that the knowledge of *vyāpti* cannot be attained through perception etc leading to the impossibility of inference as a source of valid cognition (*pramāna*).<sup>2</sup> In connection with the refutation of the view of the Cārvākas regarding the impossibility of the ascertainment of *Vyāpti* (*Vyāptigraha*), the Buddhists have come forward and are of the opinion that *Vyāpti* can easily be ascertained with the help of identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*). To them *vyāpti* remains between an object and the particular nature remaining in it. In the inference-‘It is a tree, as it has got the property remaining in *Śimśapā*’ (*ayam vrksah śimśapātvāt śimśapā* is an object in which there is the invariable relation of treeness. If the causal relation remains in two objects, the *vyāpti* in the form of *tadutpatti* remains between them. In the inferential form-‘The mountain has got fire, as it has got smoke’ (*parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*) there is the relation of cause and effect between smoke and fire, which is *vyāpti*.<sup>3</sup> The inseparable relation in the form of *vyāpti* is called *avinābhāva*. The term ‘*vinā*’ means the locus of the absolute negation of a *sādhyā* (*sādhyāntābhāvavān*). The meaning of the negative particle ‘*nañ*’ (*nañartha*) is connected with an absence (*abhāva*). Hence the meaning of the term ‘*avinābhāva*’ would be the locusness of the absence of the superstratumness determined by the locus of the absence of the probandum (*sādhyābhāvavadvrttyabhāvavattvam*).

Criticizing the Carvakas the Buddhists argue whether they forward any argument in support of their statement or not. If not, they cannot justify their standpoint and their position becomes baseless (*aśiraska*). A proposition, which is alone i.e., not guarded by any ground, cannot establish the content of the proposition. (*‘Ekakinī pratijñā hi pratijñātam na sādhyat’*). If the answer in the positive, they may be charged for making a self-contradictory statement (*svavyāghāta*) like ‘*mama mātā vandhyā*’ (i.e., My mother is barren) etc. Moreover, to distinguish between *Pramāna* and *Pramanābhāsa* (pseudo-*pramana*), to know others judgments as contradictory, to know the absence of something, to know the intention of others etc they virtually take recourse to inferential cognition. (*‘Pramānastadabhasavyvasthāpanam, paragatavipratipattih vacanalingeneti’* etc).<sup>4</sup>

Udayana has raised some problems against the view of the Cārvākas. First, what is the meaning of the term *sambhavana*? The probability is nothing but a kind of doubt (*‘sambhavanā hi sandehah’*), which does not exist in an object already seen. The object is ascertained as soon as it is seen. Hence there is no scope of doubt. It cannot also exist in an object not seen earlier at all. For, the non-cognition of an object points to its absence.

(*‘Sambhavanā hi sandehah, sa ca drstau nāsti tasya niścayāt adrstau ca nāsti anupalabddhau tadabhāvasya nīrnayāt’*)<sup>5</sup>.

Secondly, if the sense organs like eye etc were excluded from the causes of perception on account of the fact that they are not perceptible in nature, perception would not be accepted as a source of knowledge. (*‘Hetau pratyksakarane caksurādau vādhite sati pratyaksamapi pramānam na syāt’-Ibid*). If it is not accepted that they are existent even though they are not seen, it goes against the basic presupposition of the Cārvākas. (*‘Anupalabdihikale’pi tasya sattve tu vyabhicārāt nānupalabdhirabhāvavadharane hetuh’*).<sup>6</sup>

Lastly, if there is fear or doubt, there is inference. If there is the doubt of deviation between two objects existing in different time and place, the knowledge of different time and place is established through inference. (*‘Taddeśatatkālayorvyabhicārābhāvaniścayāt kālāntaradeśāntarasthayorvyabhicārasamkā syāt kālāntaradeśāntarasthajñānañcānumānādeveti siddhamanumānam’*)<sup>7</sup>.

From above it is proved that any type of doubt is always welcome in Philosophy. The Carvakas raised the doubt of deviation (*vyabhicārasamkā*) initially. That is why; the Buddhists have got scope to remove the same doubt with the arguments of their own. In this way philosophy grows.

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Each and every system of philosophy nourishes doubt in various matters for having philosophical exercise.

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