



DECONSTRUCTING LANGUAGE: A GRAMMATICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

Each world is a phonetic development and each dialect is a metalanguage. Taking this preface as our beginning stage, this article goes for deconstructing social reality by scrutinizing the idea of the person whereupon it is for the most part manufactured. From an underlying thought of the individual pronouns "I" and "You" as deictic components which need semantic importance inside the theoretical arrangement of dialect, we will dive into more profound levels of dialect, the individuals who go past the domain of cognizance, culture and will, endeavoring to find close connections amongst Grammar and Politics.

KEYWORDS: Sociolinguistics, grammar (deixis), deconstruction, personal and collective identities.

INTRODUCTION :

Dialect makes reality by methods for its semantic vocabulary. What we comprehend as Society is a dynamic development which comprises of the inconvenience of ideas and numbers after something that was "there" however stayed indistinct. Understood etymologists, for example, Whorf or GarcíaCalvo have considered the intensity of dialect to shape reality by methods for division and have seen the association amongst importance and being. As indicated by these scholars, things of this world - including people of this human culture - appear as long as they are immersed with a word and dissected into hypothetical parts. There is dependably this necessity of theoretical learning which is, in any case, joined by the need to discover something concrete, an immediate contact with the physical or characteristic world, what we could allude to as "matter", a typical substance shared by everything that is continually changing in everlasting transition. This material reality of the world can be viewed as an affection to legitimize the obvious polarity amongst Language and the outside world; really, Physics needs this division keeping in mind the end goal to affirm reality of its speculations in view of outer certainties. Regardless, the investigation of this Matter inside any piece or component of this world we may pick demonstrates boundless as the matter of things can simply be changed into different things, yet it will never achieve "the Matter", one of the most elevated reflections we can consider. This proof involves us to imagine that, a long way from being the farthest point or extreme ground of the World's logical portrayal, Matter is diminished to its name "matter", and this lessening of the name to its exacting feeling of flatus vocis makes the World ONE with Language considered as "commotion" "resonation", as in they both wind up unbelievable, and in this way, unknown1 .

Regardless of this fundamental indescribability, both World and Language are incomprehensibly equipped for thinking about themselves and manufacturing thoughts regarding themselves. These thoughts turn out to be genuine articles and achieve the poise of components of the non-ideological reality similarly as the components of reality gain the status of perfect or characterized creatures: for instance, "woodland" is thought to be the "presence" or "being" of the backwoods, and "this unclear vague thing that is here" is made to be "a triangle" or "a lowly".

The World's attention to this procedure of awareness influences Language to end up a "thing" of the World subject to portrayal, a question of study, a chronicled and social being². What do the World and Language say in regards to themselves? Having recognized that Language and social world are two sides of a similar coin, indistinguishable one from the other, let us attempt to set up close parallelisms and meeting focuses between the "siblings"³.

When we break down Society, the main thing we can watch is that there isn't one society or universe however a few social orders or universes. Every general public insists itself as a substance through interior rationality and through restriction to the rest, and the awareness of that element is comparable to its existence. So also, when we contemplate Language, we see that there isn't just a single all inclusive dialect, however various dialects which affirm their personality through inner union and through contrast with other languages⁴.

In reference to their inward constitution, we find that the individual is the fundamental foundation of Society, and that the supposed idiolect - the dialect talked by one individual - is the insignificant type of a dialect. To the extent the individual is concerned, he ought to be the unmistakable face of society yet in the meantime he should save his particular identity. Moreover, an idiolect must be a case or duplicate of a particular dialect be that as it may, simultaneously, it must incorporate some complex quirks.

In the event that we presently proceed onward to watch Society when all is said in done and from inside, we discover Life, in other words, things and individuals unendingly appearing; and in the investigation of Language all in all, we see that it is continually being created or acknowledged in discourse acts; at the same time, we can perceive both in Society and in Language the nearness of characterized, lasting substances or components and the presence of settled tenets or laws⁵. There is a ceaseless connection amongst life and social association, and furthermore amongst discourse and dialect framework. The first is basically in view of a loyal multiplication of the second, and the second comprises in predicting what is going on or may occur in the first.

Thinking about the World as a set up framework, we can recognize two fundamental parts: 1) things - in its more extensive sense which incorporates individuals and occasions; 2) rules for their association inside the framework and furthermore for their common connection and working throughout everyday life. On account of Language, it is constituted by: 1) littlest units of significance (lexemes); 2) files of connection and capacity (morphemes). Obviously, these constituents can't be thought about independently.

Beside this fundamental structure, there is a law of reflection which runs the procedures through which capacities and connections among things and words are merged with the goal that they turn into an "entire" thing or a word "in its own particular right"⁶. Thus, we can recognize distinctive degrees of reflection in regards to things and words: from those which are substantial (e.g. "a person") to those which are financially detectable (e.g. "a country's subject"), or hypothetically possible (e.g. "people"), or unconceivable however sensibly thinkable (e.g. "individual personality") in order to

achieve the point where we discover things or words which are unfathomable, in other words, past reflection (e.g. "Being", "Non-Being", "I").

Together with this limit of deliberation or conceptualization which goes with our human comprehension, we locate a correlative need of solid information as we called attention to toward the start of this reflection. It is very evident that this solid condition or impression of things isn't something that things can have in themselves - as it is the situation of their social, bland or theoretical reality- - yet it is specifically connected to the demonstration of their appearance.

Notwithstanding, the particular presence that happens with that development relies upon the hand, eye, heart, and so on that witnesses this rise, in other words, it relies upon "me" who turns into the focal point of Life. "I" am where the conceptual reality of the World and the present sign of that World unite (GarcíaCalvo 1973: 251).

We are infiltrating the most intuitive level of dialect, where we discover those words which in linguistic terms are called deictic components. These components don't mean anything, they don't assign or predicate: they simply point to a space that isn't semantically characterized yet it is controlled by the discourse demonstration in which they are utilized. This space is definitely not a clear space, yet it is shaped by an arrangement of directions, the center of which is the first deictic component "I". "I" am where what is said harmonizes with the activity of saying it. In addition, when we say "I" we likewise signify "you" in light of the fact that in this pre-linguistic field, the words talk through my mouth or through yours openly, and we can move toward becoming speakers or addressees at various turns as we surrender to the rhythmic movement of arguments.

Going further in the contention, we could set out say that these essential deictic components are the reason for the development of individual and social characters based upon a false trade off between "the universe of deixis" and "the universe of implications" that prompts the burden of a formal person, place or thing and a typical thing upon "you" or "I" who at first were "anyone" that was talking or listening in any case any sexual or class qualification: for example, "I" move toward becoming "Diminish Smith, a representative". Also, "you" move toward becoming "Patsy Nicholson, a secretary". Also, we both progress toward becoming individuals from the gathering "Mankind", equivalent to some other part (with the goal that we can be tallied), yet in the meantime interesting, extraordinary. Clearly, this marriage between the general and the specific demonstrates nonsensical and opposing yet this is the manner by which law based social orders in light of the confidence in the individual create (Campillo 2001: 220-221).

Give us a chance to keep looking at the etymological procedures engaged with the development of pluralist social orders imagined as shut arrangements of subjects led by governments and laws. We have just observed the transformation of "I" and "you" into genuine individuals, people with an ID card who are not diverse to the State, to the Bank or the Police, since they have a place with a similar reality (the truth of Power) and add to its propagation. The subsequent stage is to ponder the origination of "we" and "you" as the plural types of "I" and "you", together with the introduction of the third individual particular and plural. How does this happen in dialect?

In the pre-syntactic field to which deictic components point to, there are various types of connections and resistances between components. Together with the relationship "I-here" or "I-you", we discover the relationship "me-us" which here does not infer a distinction in number. In any case, in our universe of thoughts we have a tendency to decipher "us" as a plural shape in two diverse routes: 1) As an arrangement of "I's" (I+I+I...), which implies that we need to change over "us" and "I" (unadulterated indexicals) into thoughts of "ourselves" and of "me" so as to have the capacity to tally

them. This numerical translation isn't conceivable in light of the fact that when we say "us", we signify "I" with "you" or with other individuals who are not "I"; 2) As the whole of "I" + "you" or + "he" or "other individuals ". This isn't scientifically conceivable either on the grounds that components which are not homogenous can't be checked. Accordingly, "us" must be legitimately comprehended not as the plural type of "me" but rather as where the partition or separation amongst "I" and "you" is overlooked (GarcíaCalvo 1983: 158)

In any case, this non-numerical restriction is the reason for the production of numbers when all is said in done and for the foundation of the syntactic class of number specifically

Here we have the diverse stages in the development of number: 1) "us" = first individual that incorporates the audience → " us" = First individual that avoids the audience; 2) "us" that prohibits "you" is anticipated on the solitary outside "you" → rise of "you" = you with others; 3) Creation of the third individual: "they". The numerical understanding of "they" as homogenous components of a set will impact the outlandish reinterpretation of "us" and "you" as the plural types of "me" and "you"; 4) Transfer of the syntactic classification of plural to the semantic expressions of a dialect.

The conceptualization of deictic components together with the development of numbers will prompt the introduction of people socially connecting with each other and to the thought of individuals as objects of control and exchange (GarcíaCalvo 1995: 85).

What is critical to underline is that previously or beneath this social world made up of clashing characters, there is something (a world that isn't even a world) which has no name, an unfathomable liquid network shaped not by people but rather by individuals who share Language, an "I" and "you" who are tradable and who have a place with the intuitive domain of dialect, which has no semantic vocabulary, instead of the domain of culture, awareness and will, where we can locate the semantic expressions of a dialect.

It is applicable to understand that there is an interminable war between the two levels of Language as one is developing reality (Halliday 1979:247) and the other is deconstructing it. In addition, in the event that one gives himself a chance to think and feel, one can see absent much exertion that this logical inconsistency in Language is a similar one we can discover amongst I and "the I": from one viewpoint, we accept with unquestioning acknowledgment that we are a man with a formal person, place or thing and a date of birth and passing; then again, there is something in us which does not acknowledge this judgment to learning and demise, demonstrating defiance of heart and brain. This war is genuine legislative issues and while the individual isn't able to do any resistance as he is a subject of intensity, "I", who is free from any definition, is continually dismissing and scrutinizing the World built by implications, the World of man centric Law, of all things being equal

Moreover, Language, the favored Language can open for us another abode of genuine fellowship, where "I" am consistently getting to be "you" in the demonstration of talking, and "you" are always getting to be "I". "You" and "I" are neither isolated nor together similarly as the substances of this reality seem to be, these people who shape couples, and from couples they make social gatherings or sets. "You" and "I" can't stop in one place, we hop from mouth to mouth and don't have a place with any Homeland. In parallel, I - considered as a man or genuine substance - am constituted by a progression of connected thoughts from which I myself think that its hard to separate, and this connection to my own individual reality generates the need of safeguarding social reality as a whole⁷

To finish up, I might want to underline the intensity of the Word as a wellspring of real progressive activity against the Science of Reality, and as an instrument of the spirit's disintegration. The time has come to quit living on false figments: we don't know our identity or where we are. In fact, genuine

research into natural syntax can complete a psychoanalytic undertaking which has coordinate political and social results.

NOTES

1 According to Whorf, the illusion of meaning has come to an end in Western Indo-European languages, and this fact opens new possibilities in the understanding of Language as sound. In fact, all languages are inspired by a kind of universal rhythm analogous to Music or Mathematics (Paz 1982: 33). We should remember that Music is present in the first recordings of the Homussymbolicus (E. Trias, «La músicacomoagitación total, El Pais, Lunes 17 de Septiembre de 2007»).

2 This refers to idiomatic languages or languages of Babel as opposed to common or garden Language which does not belong to the semantic world. As I reasoned in a previous research article, “The Speaker (or consciousness) of the world cannot be spoken about because it would no longer be the subject who speaks, but the object about which something is uttered (Petisco 2011: 204).

3 We are following AgustínGarcíaCalvo’s description of world and society (GarcíaCalvo 1973: 225-268)

4 Moreover, societies develop an image of the natural universe that confers them their feigned natural character. In parallel, Languages are also presented to speakers as something natural; therefore, the whole nature will necessarily be linguistically constructed (AGC 1973: 229-230).

5 A kind of universal grammar if we evoke Chomskian theories on language, the great discovery that there is an underlying organization or grammatical wisdom which rules any speaker’s intuitions regarding grammatical precision and which, according to the American thinker, is mostly unconscious (Chomsky 1981: 14-15).

6 For example, the colour of things becomes a colour in its own right, and the additive relationship between several objectified colours becomes the Colour in its own right (on which Physics can theorise); or the copulative grammatical relationship between “Anthony and Valery” is translated into the new word “couple”; or the defining relation “John’s wife” leads to the words “dependence”, “possession”.

7 In this regard, we should remember Foucault’s words in Words and Things: It is a relief to think that the concept human being is a recent invention, a figure that has only existed for two centuries, a mere page in our knowledge that will be turned as soon as he finds out a new shape (quoted by FernándezMengual 2005: 31).

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