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CONTRIBUTION OF X PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDI TO MODERNIZATION OF INDIA



Nagappa P. Koti

Asst. Professor Dept of History ,
Shri Jagadamba First Grade Art's And Science College Hittinahalli, LT. Vijayapura .

ABSTRACT

India's remarkable economic growth and newfound access to arms from abroad have raised the prospect of a major rearmament of the country. Be that as it may, without a few approach and hierarchical changes, India's endeavors to modernize its military won't adjust the nation's capacity to manage basic security dangers. Our exploration proposes that India's military modernization needs a straightforward, true blue and productive obtainment process. Further, a head of guard staff could accommodate the contending needs over the three military administrations. At last, India's guard explore organizations should be subjected to more noteworthy oversight.

KEYWORDS :Indira Gandhi , modernization of India , true blue and productive obtainment process.

INTRODUCTION

India's quick monetary development and freshly discovered access to military innovation, particularly by method for its rapprochement with the United States, have raised any expectations of a military recovery in the nation. Against this confidence about the ascent of Indian military power stands the truth that India has not possessed the capacity to modify its military-vital position in spite of being one of the world's biggest merchants of cutting edge customary weapons for three decades.

We trust that common military relations in India have concentrated too intensely on one side of the issue – how to guarantee non military personnel control over the military, while ignoring the other – how to construct and field a viable military power. This lopsidedness in common military relations has

made military modernization and changes experience the ill effects of an absence of political direction, disunity of reason and exertion and material and intellectual corruption.

The Effects of Strategic Restraint

Sixty years in the wake of leaving on a competition with Pakistan, India has not possessed the capacity to change its key association with a nation short of what one-fifth its size. India's numerous counterinsurgencies have kept going twenty years on a normal, twofold the overall normal. Since the 1998 atomic tests, reports of a developing rocket hole with Pakistan have raised doubt about the nature of India's atomic impediment. The high purpose of Indian military history – the freedom of Bangladesh in 1971– along these lines, remains in sharp differentiation to the persevering powerlessness of the nation to raise viable military powers.

No factor more records for the heedless idea of Indian military modernization than the absence of political administration on guard, coming from the principle of vital limitation. Key political pioneers dismissed the utilization of power as an instrument of legislative issues for a strategy of key limitation that limited the significance of the military.

The Government of India held to its solid hostile to militarism in spite of the truth of contention and war that took after autonomy. Much has been made of the minimizing of the administration boss in the convention rank, yet of more prominent outcome was the height of military science and research as fundamental to the long haul guard of India over the military themselves. Nehru welcomed British physicist P.M.S. Blackett to inspect the connection amongst science and resistance. Blackett returned with a report that called for topping Indian guard spending at 2 percent of GDP and constrained military modernization. He additionally suggested state subsidizing and responsibility for examine research facilities and set up his protégé, Daulat Singh Kothari, as the leader of the labs.

Indian resistance spending diminished amid the 1950s. Of the three administrations, the Indian Navy got more prominent consideration with arrangements for the procurement of India's first plane carrying warship. The Indian Air Force procured World War II surplus Canberra transport. The Indian Army, the greatest administration by a wide edge, went to Congo on an UN peacekeeping mission, however was dismissed by and large. India had its first protection acquisition embarrassment when purchasing old jeeps and encountered its first considerate military emergency when an armed force boss debilitated to leave dissenting political impedance in military issues. The decade finished in the administration's 'forward approach' against China, which Nehru foisted on an ill-equipped armed force, and prompted the war of 1962 with China that finished in an embarrassing Indian annihilation.

The preeminent exercise of 1962 was that India couldn't bear the cost of further military conservation. The Indian government propelled a critical military extension program that multiplied the extent of the armed force and raised a battling aviation based armed forces. With the concentration moving North, the Indian Navy got less consideration. A less perceived exercise of the war was that political impedance in military issues should be restricted. The military – and particularly the armed force – requested and got operational and institutional independence, a reality most obvious in the wars of 1965 and 1971.

The issue, notwithstanding, was that the political authority did not abruptly turn out to be more alright with the military as a foundation; they stayed careful about the likelihood of an overthrow and militarism all the more for the most part.

The Indian common military relations scene has changed possibly since. In the eighties, there was a level of political-military juncture in the Rajiv Gandhi government: Rajiv delegated a military buff, Arun Singh, as the priest of state for safeguard. In the meantime, Krishnaswami Sundarji, an

extraordinary officer, turned into the armed force boss. Together they propelled an eager program of military modernization in light of Pakistani rearmament and nuclearization. Pakistan's nuclearization enabled that nation to heighten the subconventional struggle in Kashmir while stemming Indian capacity to raise to a general war, where it had prevalence. India is yet to rise up out of this soundness flimsiness Catch 22.

We don't know why Rajiv Gandhi consented to the particular sort of military modernization that happened in the mid-eighties, yet then ventured once more from utilizing this limit in 1987 amid the Brasstacks emergency. Sundarji later wrote in a hidden work of fiction and told his numerous companions that Brasstacks was the last shot India needed to overwhelm a non-atomic Pakistan.

The perplex of Brasstacks remains in a line of comparable choices. In 1971, India did not push the upside of its triumph in the eastern performance center toward the West. Rather, New Delhi, under uberrealist Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, marked on to an ambiguous assentation at Simla that submitted the two sides to quiet determination of future debate with no implementation measures. India's choice to hold up 24 years between its first atomic test in 1974 and the second arrangement of tests in 1998 is similarly confounding. For what reason did it not finish after the 1974 test, and for what reason did it test in 1998?

Fundamental these riddles is a wonderful inclination for vital limitation. Indian pioneers just have not seen the utilization of power as a valuable instrument of legislative issues. This establishment of indecision advises Indian barrier strategy, and thus its military modernization and change endeavors

Undoubtedly, military restriction in a locale as unstable as South Asia is insightful and has convinced the immense forces to oblige India's ascent, however it doesn't help military arranging. Together with the detachment of the military from the administration, divisions among the administrations and between the administrations and other related offices, and the powerlessness of the military to look for formal help for approaches it regards essential, India's vital restriction has served to deny political direction to the endeavors of the military to modernize. As insightful as vital restriction might be, Pakistan, India's essential adversary, scarcely trusts it to be valid. Islamabad gets ready as though India were a forceful power and this really affects India's security.

Imbalance in Civil-Military Relations

What suffices for a a military modernization design is a list of things to get of weapon frameworks adding up to as much as \$100 billion from the three administrations and empty declarations of coming leaps forward from the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the chief office for military research in India.

The procedure is illustrative. The military propose to secure certain weapon frameworks. The political authority and the regular citizen organization, particularly the Ministry of Finance, respond to these solicitations, concurring on a few and dismissing others. Various dysfunctions follow.

To begin with, the administrations see things diversely and their plans are basically awkward. Falling off the experience of the Kargil war and Operation Parakram, the Indian Army appears to have landed at a Cold Start principle, looking to locate some battling space between subconventional struggle and atomic trade in the standoff with Pakistan. The teaching may not be legitimate arrangement, but rather it advises the armed force's list of things to get, where assault helicopters, tanks and long-go mounted guns emerge as marquee things. The Indian Air Force (IAF), in the mean time, is the essential instrument of the nation's atomic impediment. The IAF's nearby second part is air prevalence and air guard. Close air bolster, to which the IAF has belatedly concurred and which is fundamental to the armed force's Cold Start convention, is a far off fourth.

The Indian Navy needs to secure the nation's ocean paths of interchanges, ensure its vitality supplies and monitor its exchange courses. It needs further to be the vehicle of Indian maritime strategy and sees a part in the counter theft endeavors in the Malacca Straits and the Horn of Africa. What is less clear is the means by which the Indian Navy may contribute in case of a war with Pakistan. The naval force might want just to brush past the issue of Pakistan and reach for the more stupendous tasks. Likewise, the Indian Navy's greatest acquirement arrange is a retrofitted plane carrying warship from Russia.

India's three administrations have drastically unique perspectives of what their part in India's security ought to be, and there is no political push to guarantee this coordination. Icy Start remains a risky recommendation. India's atomic obstruction stays fastened to a solitary conveyance framework: contender air ship. In the mean time, the Indian Army's energies are scattered with counterinsurgency obligations, which may build complex if the armed force is advised to battle the rising radical insurrection, the Naxalites. And this when the essential security risk to the nation has been fear mongering. After the Mumbai assaults, the Indian government and the general population of India are said to have made plans to handle the issue fast, yet today the administration's priest responsible for inner security, Palaniappan Chidambaram, is more under attack himself than grabbing the shrouded adversary.

Second, in spite of rehashed calls for and commissions into changes in the higher protection structure, arranging, knowledge, resistance generation and obtainment, the Indian national security foundation stays divided and awkward. The legislature and military have prevailing in changes prepared by increases to the protection spending plan however neglected to establish changes that require changes in association and needs.

The most widely recognized case of intense change is the long-standing suggestion for a head of guard staff. A military boss, instead of the administration boss, could be an answer for the issue that causes the three administrations not to accommodate their needs. Be that as it may, political pioneers have rejected the making of the situation of military president, essentially because of a paranoid fear of giving a military officer excessively control. Rather than a head of safeguard staff, the administration has attempted to introduce an incorporated protection staff that should embrace compromise between the administrations, however which truly is a toothless body with little impact.

Ultimately, the Ministry of Defense has a back segment deputed by the Ministry of Finance. This area administers all protection consumptions, even after they have been approved. Once the bureau has affirmed a spending thing, what expert does the area need to turn down solicitations? In any case, the back segment brings up issues of legitimacy, insight and approach that ought to under ordinary conditions be under the domain of the guard serve.

Nuclearisation, Modernisation and Muscle Flexing

The Indian military's drive towards becoming a better prepared and equipped force started in earnest from the time of Indira Gandhi's accession to power in the late 1960s. On becoming Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi was confronted with a plethora of domestic problems: major drought and famine across the country; massive national debt and devaluation of the currency; rise of religious militancy, ethnic violence and ultra-leftist insurgency; growing labour unrest; and a big drop in industrial output. She dealt with these problems and challenges skilfully, while consolidating her position within her party (Adams & Whitehead, 1997, pp. 203–232).

It was, however, on the security front that Indira Gandhi realised that major change was required. India's initial post-independence strategy of maintaining conventional military superiority

over Pakistan had been somewhat dented after Pakistan started receiving substantial United States (US) military aid since the mid-1950s, which helped to transform its military into a large, modern and mechanised force. The 1965 Indo–Pak war demonstrated the newly acquired prowess of the Pakistani military in ample measure and it was only the intervention of the superpowers that brought the war to an end. After 1962, China was an even bigger military threat than Pakistan. This threat magnified further as Chinese defence spending more than doubled between 1960 (US\$ 16 billion) and 1970 (US\$ 37 billion) (The RAND Corporation, 1989, p. 17) and China carried out a series of nuclear weapons tests in 1964, which catapulted it into the nuclear weapons club. Growing strategic ties between China and Pakistan also meant that India had to be militarily prepared to fight a joint Sino-Pak offensive on both the eastern and western fronts simultaneously (Cohen, 2001, p. 133). Indira Gandhi's strategic outlook was thus clear: India had to be militarily prepared to meet the Sino-Pak threat and develop a robust defensive capability (Braun, 1983). She, therefore, allocated more resources (US\$ 9 billion in 1970, up from US\$ 4 billion in 1960) for defence procurement and for defence research and development (Subrahmanyam, 1973; The RAND Corporation, 1989, p. 17), and encouraged the Indian military to become bigger, better and modern.

The test of this new outlook came in 1971 when the Pakistani military's crackdown on the Bengali nationalists set into motion a civil war in East Pakistan and resulted in a 6 million-plus refugee influx into India. During this crisis, the Indian government pleaded with the US and the UN to prevail upon Pakistan to stop its military atrocities in East Pakistan so that the refugees could be returned. When India's pleas fell on deaf ears in Washington and the UN proved ineffectual, the Indian military began to prepare for war and started providing covert military assistance to the Bengali insurgent outfit, the Mukti Bahini or Freedom Force (Choudhury, 1968; LaPorte, 1972, p. 107; Heraclides, 1991; Ganguly, 1998, p. 120). Indira Gandhi also signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union in August 1971, in order to obtain a pledge from Moscow that Soviet military forces would come to India's defence if Pakistani forces attacked India and the US and China decided to intervene on behalf of Pakistan (Hersh, 1983, pp. 450–452). The attack came on 3 December 1971, when the Pakistan air force carried out a strike on eight Indian airfields. Being well prepared, Indian forces responded swiftly and decisively, and on 6 December, the Indian government formally recognised the birth of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005, p. 33). The war in East Pakistan finished in two weeks with the unconditional surrender of Pakistani forces. During the war, the Indian military captured almost 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war as well as a substantial cache of weapons. Importantly for India, the much-trumpeted Chinese military support for Pakistan did not materialise during the war; moreover, although the US sent the warship Enterprise from its Pacific Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal, it sailed westwards, passing south of Sri Lanka, and never came near East Pakistan, thereby accepting the Indian victory as a *fait accompli* (Rose & Sisson, 1990).

While India's conventional military superiority over Pakistan was unquestionable in the 1971 IndoPak war, the same could not be said about the India's military standing vis-à-vis the Chinese PLA. India's military weakness had been brutally exposed by the Chinese in the 1962 Sino-Indian war and China had built on that conventional superiority by acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in 1970, also legitimised China's acquisition of nuclear weapons (Lodgaard, 2010). China's total spending on defence in 1970 (US\$ 37 billion) was also roughly four times more than that of India's (US\$ 9 billion) (The RAND Corporation, 1989, p. 17). Therefore, from the point of view of India's national security vis-à-vis China, two things were urgently required: the development of India's nuclear weapons programme so that India could deter the Chinese from making any attempt at nuclear blackmail (Koithara, 1999); and

the development of India's conventional military capability, particularly the army's high-altitude mountain warfare capability and the air force's air support capability, so that Indian forces could thwart attempts by the PLA to advance into Indian territory across the contested Sino-Indian border.

Indian scientists' interest in nuclear research had started when Homi J. Bhabha, a theoretical physicist, set up the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Mumbai in 1944. After independence, Bhabha and his colleague, Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar, convinced Prime Minister Nehru to allocate resources for setting up highly specialised research institutes to carry out nuclear research (Kapur, 2001, p. 25). The Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was duly set up in August 1948. In August 1954, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was created and given the sole responsibility for all nuclear research activities in the country; in 1958, the AEC was brought under the DAE. In 1954, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) was set up and India's first nuclear reactor, APSARA, located in the BARC and supplied with nuclear fuel by the British, went critical in 1956. A second reactor, CIRUS, built with Canadian collaboration, went critical in 1960. In 1964, India successfully opened a reprocessing plant within the BARC complex and a US assessment suggested that India could start the development of nuclear weapons if it wanted to do so (Kapur, 2001, p. 35). But, until Nehru's death in 1964, the decision to develop a nuclear bomb had not been taken.

The key drivers of India's military modernisation were lessons learned from past wars, the changing regional and international milieu and the outlook and ambition of key decision makers. During the Bangladesh crisis, the US and China had acted threateningly towards India. The presence of the US aircraft carrier, Enterprise, in the Indian Ocean during the war had unnerved the Indian leaders, and subsequently shaped their strategic perception and outlook. After the fall of the Shah in Iran in March 1979, the US government started to give prominence to its naval base in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, which again unnerved the Indian leaders. Indian leaders were further worried by America's massive military assistance to Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, which greatly increased Pakistan's conventional military capacity, and Washington's reported attempt to procure a naval base at Trincomalee in eastern Sri Lanka (Sengupta & Ganguly, 2013, p. 111). By the early 1980s, it was also an open secret that Pakistan was trying to build nuclear weapons in spite of repeated denials by Islamabad and Washington. Indira Gandhi, as Prime Minister from 1967 to 1977 and then from 1980 to 1984, played a key role in pushing for military modernisation. Her successors, Morarji Desai and Charan Singh during the Janata interlude from 1977–1979 and then Rajiv Gandhi from 1984 to 1989, generally supported the policy to modernise and expand the military.

While military modernisation augmented India's defensive capabilities and bolstered national security, one of its side effects was to tempt Indian leaders, from time to time, to use military power to pursue political objectives within the region, but not always with the desired results. For instance, basking in the glory of victory in the 1971 Bangladesh war and India's first nuclear test, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to use the Indian military to forcibly incorporate the princely Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim as India's 22nd state in 1975 (Datta-Ray, 1984). Then, in the early 1980s, alarmed by the growing influence and presence of the US and China in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proclaimed a 'regional doctrine' (Hardgrave Jr, 1984, p. 167), which, in essence, stated that interference by any extra-regional power in South Asian affairs would be perceived by India as harmful to its national security and therefore not be welcome (Cohen, 2001, pp. 137–138). This was India's way of trying to keep China and the US out of the region by signalling to India's smaller neighbours that if they required military assistance, they should seek it from India.

No Legitimate Procurement Process

Corruption in weapons procurement has been a political issue since the mid-1980s, when affirmations of a progression of paybacks in the buy of Bofors mounted guns, HDW submarines and different things prepared a restriction that expelled Rajiv Gandhi from control in 1989. From that point forward, Indian political pioneers have made a decent attempt not to give off an impression of being degenerate, making a special effort to back off new buys.

Nonetheless, debasement is as yet an issue, as appeared in the 2001 Tehelka uncover of political pioneers tolerating fixes as a byproduct of barrier contracts. As of late, Uday Bhaskar, the Indian Navy officer and protection investigator, composed biting that for various years now the military, which urgently require modernization, have been returning unspent assets to the treasury.

There is far reaching acknowledgment that defilement is ethically dishonest and hindering to the reason for Indian security. We accept, in any case, that the second-and third-arrange issues of defilement have unacknowledged effect on military modernization and limit. The Defense Procurement Manual and Procedures on the Ministry of Defense's site are the initial phases the correct way, however the Indian government has for the most part neglected to fabricate a straightforward and honest to goodness obtainment process.

The profound underlying foundations of defilement reach out to military innovative work and to the core of India's outside relations. Since the mid-1970s, be that as it may, the DRDO left on various yearning and all around subsidized tasks to manufacture a warrior airplane, a tank, and rockets. Each of the three ventures struggled.

While the flying machine and tank ventures have to a great extent fizzled, the rocket program is viewed as effective. The notoriety of the achievement conveyed the executive of the rocket program, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, to the administration. However in 2010, no Indian rocket in the munitions stockpile of the military has figured out how to adjust the vital condition with Pakistan or China. The Prithvi short-run rocket isn't helpful in light of its range and fluid fuel needs. The more drawn out range Agni models have experienced various tests without entering the armed force's stockpile. Different varieties, for example, Nag and Akash, have restricted vital reason.

The virtual imposing business model over military research in state-claimed labs has implied that the copious energies of the Indian private division have stayed outside the resistance business. Where in the United States, little and medium-sized guard temporary workers frame the foundation of the examination complex, India is a long way from deduction thusly. Regardless of ongoing endeavors to incorporate the private part through different plans, there keeps on being doubt of private industry in the Indian safeguard foundation. We trust it is less demanding for a private outside provider to win an agreement with the Ministry of Defense than it is for a little private Indian organization to do as such.

For quite a long time, the Indian government has acknowledged untrustworthy guarantees made by DRDO as the reason for giving billions of dollars of help as a result of the holding on belief system of autarky. The best accomplishment of military research in India comes not from the DRDO, but rather from the Atomic Energy Commission, which manufactured the atomic gadgets. Be that as it may, the administration has been unwilling to subject DRDO to open responsibility. Rather, the head of DRDO fills in as the protection clergyman's logical consultant. The two positions – of provider and guide – bring inalienable irreconcilable circumstance, however this has not been an issue in India by any stretch of the imagination.

The second example of foundational debasement originates from the powerlessness of the Indian barrier framework to wean itself from the supply of Soviet/Russian gear. The reasons why India at first went to the Soviet Union for weapons are outstanding. The United States picked Pakistan, India

went to the Soviet Union. Yet, that political choice was fortified by thoughts regarding the debasement free nature of the state-possessed Soviet resistance industry and the benefit mindedness of western, and particularly American, firms.

This portrayal has dependably been false. Soviet/Russian providers have occupied with as much defilement as western firms, but since the Soviet Union was a shut framework, the debasement – which was accounted for first in the press in the provider nations – was never extremely revealed in the Soviet Union. This custom proceeds, however the Russian free press has been more disparaging of the nation's protection bargains. For sure, the individuals who filled in as Indian 'operators' for the Soviet firms have featured the better business routine with regards to Russians, a ludicrous issue in light of India's ongoing travails with the retrofit and offer of the Russian plane carrying warship Admiral Gorshkov.

The propensity is repeated in Indian inclinations in managing the West too. Western firms have dependably been viewed as cash grubbing, an assessment that exists over the political range and is pervasive in the non military personnel administration. New Delhi appears to incline toward government-to-government remote military deals, which are thusly causing some level of challenge from clients who need longer-term upkeep game plans with providers.

The political rapprochement amongst India and the United States has not yet separated into the framework for dispositions to change significantly. India's developing military supply association with Israel is enlightening. The best Israeli firm in the Indian market is Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), a state-possessed organization. IAI rushed to receive the Russian model of task in India: offering the DRDO co-improvement chances to win contracts. Interestingly, American firms are hesitant to work with, not to mention exchange top of the line innovation to a state claimed venture. They would like to set up an auxiliary in India, which could hold control of the innovation.

India has been one of the greatest merchants of cutting edge ordinary weapons over the most recent thirty years, yet this managed rearmament has not modified India's key position. The military push for modernization, yet don't have the specialist to mount the national battle fundamental for changing the security state of the nation. Spending increments conveyed by a quickly growing economy and access to western innovation beforehand denied to India have prompted positive thinking about Indian military power, yet the brokenness in India's thoughtful military relations lessens the effect of rearmament. Equipping without pointing has some reason in influencing other awesome forces of India's considerate ascent, yet it can't be the premise of military arranging.

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