



REVIEW OF RESEARCH

ISSN: 2249-894X

IMPACT FACTOR : 5.2331(UIF)

VOLUME - 7 | ISSUE - 6 | MARCH - 2018




THE PLAN FOR THE INDIA'S PARTITION

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ABSTRACT

Here in this context I have come across how the plan of partition of India was done . How it has affected the people , the masses the provinces and the congress and the Muslim League. Prime Minister Attlee and Mountbatten role in the partition plan was more. At the time of partition they have to take into concern of the massive people , Big fertile provinces like Bengal and Punjab was partition on communal grounds ? or on political grounds ? or the British Predominancy over the India Territories ? Nehru suggested Mountbatten to taken steps while partition . The ideology of Jinnah was different here at the time of partition even the congress has played its role in partition of India. We see that on the basis of cabinet missions recommendation the partition was done . we also see how adverse affect it had after the partition of the Nation into two halves i.e. India and Pakistan.



KEY WORDS: Communal , Imperialist, Fragmentation, Negotiation, Ambiguity, Paramount , Divergent , Rampant, Referendum.

INTRODUCTION

In their own interest and that interest of their empire the British Followed the Policy of Divide and Rule. They resented the Congress demand for independence they sowed seeds of communalism among the Muslims and permitted them to possess arm Gandhiji's also did not object this discrimination . Thus they created a tense .

Cerfam factors played a vital in partition of the country . They were

- 1) The British
- 2) Role of Jinnah
- 3) Opposition for the congress party
- 4) Inform Govt. 1946-47.
- 5) Attlee's
- 6) Mountabatten Plan.

It was not only Jinnah but the Governors of both Punjab and Bengal who had advised the Viceroy against the possibility of dividing the respective provinces . Sir Evan Jenkins the Governor of Punjab had

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Prime Minister Attlee's instruction to Mountbatten had predominantly imperialist overtones such as to obtain a unitary Government for British India and the Indian states. If possible with the commonwealth, to avoid a breach in the continuity of the Indian Army in order to secure the defence requirements of India, and to ensure a continued collaboration with Britain in the security of the Indian Ocean area. The basis of all this planning was to be the Cabinet Mission's recommendations. On which an agreement of all the diverse Indian political opinions was to be acquired so that the process of British withdrawal may go forward as smoothly as possible. However in doing so Attlee had failed to understand that rescuing the plan was a non starter with Jinnah and the Muslim League and therefore on matter how much the Indian situation, it could not be the ideal solution.

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2) PARTITION OF THE PROVINCE :

A dynamic, prosperous and enterprising community with a strong agricultural base in the Punjab they contributed more to the economy of the province than their notional proportion represented. They were to be divided into two fairly equal halves and were to accept such a partition with hardly any alternative except negotiations. But their concerns with partition of the province were apologetically set aside by Mountbatten and this administrative naivety of the British resulted in considerable damage to the process of transfer of power when the partition, machinery actually started rolling. The Sikhs with the burden of history behind them were in no way conducive, rather violently opposed to the idea of this division.

As for Bengal, its partition, in Sir Fredrick Burrow words, would reduce the eastern part of the province into a 'rural slum' as it was not a going concern and never would be the drive for a united and independent Bengal supported by Jinnah and a few nationalist Bengali leaders was strongly opposed by Congress as, warned by Nehru, it would mean the dominance of the Muslim League and the entire province going over to the Pakistan area. His statement that Congress could agree to Bengal derived out of the rounds of talks and negotiations. The mission plan foundered on divergent hopes in the sense that the congress was unhappy for reading a grant and concession to the Pakistan demand, whereas conversely the Muslim League refused to accept it as a formula which did not seriously consider the idea of Pakistan.

The joint planning committee came up with a formal plan worked out in considerable detail and emphasizing a gradual and phased withdrawal both of authority and territory. The Punjab and Bengal were to be partitioned, thus offering Jinnah his moth eaten Pakistan though "no mention of Pakistan as such should be made in the announcement giving the plan for India's future. There seems thus, to be an ambiguity regarding the transfer of power to one or more successor states in the plan being drafted at this juncture, At the same time an underlying principle of policy was to throw an increasing weight of responsibility on the parties, as whatever was being done ran a very high risk of either revolution or a paralysis of the administration.

The policy also enunciated it's reservations with regard to a spectacular debate in parliament to get authority for its approval, as it would be to the advantage of the Indian's to secure the transfer, as quietly as possible. Nehru's rejection of the plan led Mountbatten to quickly drop the idea of a united Bengal on which he had a begun to persuade London to make an exception to Bengal and allow it to become an independent dominion.

The frontier with the Congress in power was also a trouble some area liable to drop to bits as the state of tension was on the rise under the existing regime. The partition scheme according to the Governor Sir Olod Caroe, was not viable and would not be able to ensure the economic future of the province already

two and half crores of rupees were required from the centre to keep the tribes at bay and the demand for more was always there. He asked for general elections in the NWFP straight away rather than at a later stage even though they had been held only a year ago, but in his opinion it was the best remedy to cure the present situation of turmoil and contusion and reach a moderately acceptable solution. A solid frontier was India's strength either way, divided or united. But Mountbatten keeping in view Nehru's opposition to elections in the province rejected the idea as it would fog the main issues and incur the annoyance of Congress like the partition of the Punjab and Bengal this was another of League's misfortunes resulting from the British Congress liaison which intended to torpedo the Pakistan scheme to their obvious and common advantage, Caroe's misgivings about partition in relation to the frontier province were seen by Mountbatten as a splendid opportunity to persuade the League to give up this problem region

3) NEHRU'S OPINION TO THE PARTITION :

The Indian political dilemma. Congress was dictating its terms and Nehru was making good use of this close and personal alliance with the Viceroy. The real friends that they had become. At his suggestion the meeting with the Indian leaders was also postponed from 17th May to 2nd June as the present proposed timetable was too much of a rush on the other hand Jinnah came to know of the draft announcement when little could be done to influence the essential character of the plan. The division of Bengal and the Punjab and particularly the fate of Calcutta, the demand for a corridor to link the two parts of Pakistan and the need for dividing the Indian army were all attempts to fight a last battle for the case of Pakistan. It was the rejection of the Congress demand or immediate dominion status and the handing over of power to the interim government that was his most critical concern and which ultimately led to his grudging acceptance of the plan. He had no choice but to acquiesce in the planning as the only solution offered was either a mouth-eaten Pakistan or a united India nonetheless registering strong disapproval he clearly stated that the Muslim League will never agree of the present. Interim Government either by conversion or otherwise, but that it must be dissolved as soon as two constituent assemblies are formed and all power should be transferred to them immediately.

4) ROLE OF JINNAH'S :

The clamor for partitioning the provinces of the Punjab and Bengal was a sinister move of congress that would only lead to similar developments in other provinces and create further disturbance. He warned the British of this attempt at the fragmentation of India and of committing a grave mistake by falling into the congress trap. Evan Jenkins the Governor of Punjab, had also made it very clear that even if all the parties agreed to a partition of the provinces and the partition resulted, it would mean a greater disaster.

The most crucial lapse on the part of the plan makers was the utter disregard of the possibility of massive population transfer that was naturally attached with the partition of these two large province. It was liable to intensify the communal spilt and became the most fatal error in the long run. Millions of ire hung previously on this logistical neglect that its roots in the British policy of congress appeasement. It the days following the announcement of the plan, Mountbatten was heard completely over ruling any prospect of mass migrations, and hence no suitable or timely preparations for the job were undertaken. The Punjab was the scene of the most gruesome violence and but for the stubbornness of congress and the steadily diminishing authority of the Raj it could have been largely avoided. Even the pre- partition massacres of Calcutta and Noakhali could be traced to the rumors associated with the likely announcement of the partition of Bengal.

The confusion and mismanagement at this state of planning cannot be overlooked. By May 31 it was still not clear if Bengal would be partitioned or left as a unified province. The third option that of even an independent status was also being contemplated if all the major leaders of the principal Bengali parties agreed.

CONCLUSION :

The 3rd June plan came as the situational remedy of the political crisis and began to be worked upon with the fervent activity. Time was the biggest constraint. An 'off the cut' remark by Mountbatten had decided the time that was to be given to the planning for India's partition seventy two days in all a fare fill error indeed.

The 'practitioners axe' as the Radcliffe Award has come to be properly remembered, implemented lesser expertise. The boundary commissions set up for the partition of the Punjab & Bengal had a difficult and strenuous task, but also one that demanded independent and undisclosed functioning. Two nations were born and their boundaries split in seven week in a manner that three affected communities, Hindus, Muslims and the Sikhs, had no idea of their national identification or national borders, with little sense of the place in which they were located on the wrong sides of border.

Instead of accepting the responsibility even in a minor degree, Mountbatten placed the on us on the Indians of the findings and implications of the Radcliffe Award. To him it were the Indian leaders who selected the personnel of the Boundary Commission including the chairman, who dent up the terms of reference and who should therefore should the responsibility for implementing the award. It was needed a strange logic.

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