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## NATURALISTIC DUALISM

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### ABSTRACT :

**C**onsciousness became the bone of contention in the modern age. From two thousands of years, philosophers have been struggling to understand the mind-body Problem. But from the few years some other disciplines are also interested to study the consciousness and also they are trying to find out a satisfactory solution to the problem. But still consciousness is a mystery and we don't have any kind of certain answers to the problem of consciousness. Though they are not yet find any specific solution to the problem, but the advantageous thing is, now, we are able to know lots of stuffs regarding consciousness and the whole process and formation. And also we may be closer enough to the solution that we have to reveal. In this paper I have taken David Chalmers' attempts to formulate a scientific and yet non-physicalist approach to consciousness. This paper also analyzes a non-reductive approach to the consciousness to give a solution to the hard problem of consciousness all the way through naturalistic dualism of David Chalmers.



**KEYWORDS :** Consciousness, Qualia, Zombi, Intentionality, First-Person Perspective, Third-Person Perspective.

### INTRODUCTION

The billions of galaxies contains countless planets and stars again it includes trillions other worlds. In one corner of this vast space we have a world like earth and it contains something that we cannot find anywhere else, that is life. Earth got so many species that has life. From all the species why humans are so special? Out of all, human being is the most complex one why? Still it is a mystery in the life of human being. We have also some other mysteries related to life or consciousness such as: where is consciousness before our birth? When consciousness are started to exist in an infant in the mother's womb? What happens to consciousness after death? And now the most and 'Hard' one is why should we have conscious experience at all?

The study on consciousness proposes diverse outlooks and applications to too many life issues. Some years before people even did not know the name of consciousness, they call it as human nature. Even scientists and researchers are declined to study the whole idea of consciousness, as for them it is hopeless to talk about something that does not have any kind of certain existence. It is surprise that, from the 21st century, scientists, philosophers and researchers from different disciplines are thriving to understand consciousness.

## WIDE FIELDS OF APPROACH TO CONSCIOUSNESS

Scientific study on consciousness provides understanding of consciousness that arises from the functioning of the brain as well as the relation between conscious experience and cognitive processing. The disciplines those trying to study consciousness scientifically are neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Physics, Applied Psychology etc. Neuroscience is leading us to a better understanding of human behavior and of the processes that drive it. Neuroscientists, they are trying to locate consciousness physically in our brain. But the question is how subjective conscious experience is producing from millions of tiny brain cells which give rise to electrical firing? As follows, If consciousness is some way related to the functioning of the brain then, it must be related to the consciousness, because every physical system governed by physical laws. As biochemistry explained, a brain is a physical organism that transmits electrochemical signals and it ultimately related to the fundamental electromagnetic behaviors of atoms and molecules which are directed by the laws of quantum physics. In the same way Artificial intelligence researchers are interested in Artificial Consciousness (sometimes referred to as Machine consciousness or Synthetic consciousness). They are implementing and designing machines resembling human beings (Cognitive Robotics). It aimed at reproducing the relevant feature of consciousness using non-biological components.

At the same time we cannot avoid various conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness. Such types of issues we find in details in the philosophical tradition in phenomenology. Phenomenology originated in Europe and includes the work of Edmund Husserl, Martine Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and other more recent thinkers. Phenomenological approach to the consciousness denoted a descriptive as opposed to the hypothetical-theoretical or analytical approach to the problem. Phenomenology is the science of consciousness: as Husserl put it of consciousness as we experience it. In phenomenology the expression 'what-it-is-likeness' has been used as a metaphorical term for conscious. It has been the central concern of phenomenology, understood as the distinctive philosophical tradition that was inaugurated by Edmund Husserl, and subsequently continued and modified by philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and the early (pre-1930) Martin Heidegger, to name but the most eminent figures.

Phenomenology is an important part of this approach because it anchors both the theoretical and empirical investigations of consciousness in embodied and situated experience as it is lived through and as it is expressed verbally articulated description in the first person in contrast to third person correlates of experience or abstract representations. Here this paper is following phenomenology as method to guide reflective examination of experience, that using phenomenological bracketing the setting aside of options or theories about one's own experience or about consciousness in general. Subjects bracket their ordinary attitudes in order to shift attention from what they experience or what they think they experience to how they experience it.

## PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The main problem of understanding consciousness is the 'explanatory gap'<sup>1</sup> (Levine, 1983) between subjective-objective and the problem of first-person perspective of and the third-person perspective of subjective experience. But how do we know that an organism is conscious or not? What criteria do we use to determine if something is conscious? There has been a range of suggested answers to these questions. Some, like philosopher Daniel Dennett, propose that consciousness is indeed a single phenomenon. Others, such as philosopher Ned Block, make critical distinctions between different types of conscious states, with important relationships between them. And Thomas Nagel made a phrase to identify conscious being, is that 'a being is conscious if there is something it is like to be that being.' That is called "*qualia*"<sup>2</sup> (singular "quale") for short. These phenomenal qualities or qualia are really obstacles of explaining consciousness. And it is the hard part of the mind-body problem in modern science.

## HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

First of all, David Chalmers put his place started with the categorization of the problem of consciousness. David Chalmers a prominent thinker, a cognitive scientist and an Australian philosopher born on 20th April in 1966 in Sydney Australia. He is a director of the centre for consciousness and a distinguished professor of

philosophy at Australian national university as well as he is professor of philosophy and a co-director of the centre for consciousness at New York university. Especially he is interested in the area of cognitive science, philosophy of mind and language and also he is interested in the area of metaphysics, epistemology, metaphilosophy and philosophy of computing and information. Today he is best known for living new life into an old mystery.

David Chalmers divided the problems of consciousness into two; easy problems of consciousness and the hard problem. Easy problems of consciousness are such as: The ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli, the integration of information by a cognitive system, the report ability of mental states, the ability of a system to access its own internal states, the focus of attention, the deliberate control of behavior, the difference between wakefulness and sleep. The hard problem of consciousness has a unique consign in the present scenario. Chalmers calls "The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience," "The subjective quality of conscious experience" is the characterization of the subject matter of consciousness. This is the subjective part of consciousness, this is the "something it is like" to be something (Nagel), this is *qualia*, we experience sensations through our 5 senses, we feel pain/pleasure. We experience images in our imagination, emotions, and streams of thought. When we think, perceive desire and feel there is whirl of information giving out. But the dilemma here is "How is it that some organisms are subjects of experience? Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all? Why do *qualia* exist? Why is there a subjective component to experience? Why aren't we philosophical zombies<sup>3</sup>?"

#### DAVID CHALMERS PUT IT IN THIS WAY:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive there is a whirl of information processing, but there is also a subjective aspect.

This problem of consciousness is hard because, if it is not a mystery in the present century. But yet, it is hard to answer.

But Crick and Koch's problem of consciousness is a theory of the easy problems. Many theories of consciousness are like, including theatre metaphor of attention, and processing capacity, evolutionary theories based on the selective advantages of introspection or the function of *qualia* and those that deal with the neural correlates of consciousness. Among all these cases one might still ask, 'but what about subjectivity? How does this explain the actual phenomenology?

Crick and Koch themselves claim that, 'the most difficult aspect of consciousness is the so-called "hard problem" of *qualia*', but given that no one has explained how 'the blueness of blue could arise from the action of the brain. It appears fruitless to approach this problem head-on. Instead, we are attempting to find the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), in the hope that when we can explain the NCC in causal terms, this will make the problem of *qualia* clearer.' (Koch, 2003)

But, functionalists like Daniel Dennett have denied the existence of *qualia*. And he argued that there is no such blueness of blue and painfulness of pain that to be described. And he also argued for eliminating *qualia* from the discourse of mind. The basic reason for them is that mind is a machine; it cannot entertain the so-called qualitative subjective experiences called the *qualia*. We have to show that the mentality of human mind cannot be represented in a mechanistic model and that there are subjective mental states which need a first-person explanation. According to him "qualia are supposed to be properties of a subject that are ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly or immediately appraisable in consciousness" (Dennette, 1997). And The American philosopher Patricia Churchland calls hard problem a 'horns woggle problem' (Blackmore, 2005) arguing that we cannot, in advance, decide which problem will turn out to be the really hard problem.

#### Naturalistic Dualism: As David Chalmers Position

Consciousness is the only thing which is directly knowable; perhaps it's the last thing which should require explanation. According to David Chalmers, there is an explanatory gap between physical processes and conscious experience and we need some extra ingredient for explaining consciousness. Naturalistic dualism holds that consciousness is not a reducible phenomenon, it cannot be explained in terms of function, it is

fundamentally different from anything physical or any function of anything physical, and is therefore a qualitatively different entity from anything else in the known universe. Chalmers declare himself to be a mind-body dualist.

I resisted mind-body dualism for a long time, but I have now come to the point where I accept it, not just as the only tenable view but as a satisfying view in its own right. It is always possible that I am confused, or that there is a new and radical possibility that I have overlooked; but I can comfortably say that I think dualism is very likely true. I have also raised the possibility of a kind of panpsychism. Like mind-body dualism, this is initially counterintuitive, but the counter intuitiveness disappears with time. I am unsure whether the view is true or false, but it is at least intellectually appealing, and on reflection it is not too crazy to be acceptable. (Chalmers, 1996, p. 357)

Physical explanation is well-suited to the explanation of physical structures, explaining macroscopic structures in terms of detailed micro-structural constituents.

But the structure and dynamics of physical processes yield only more structure and dynamics, so structures and functions are all we can expect these processes to explain. According to Chalmers, An analysis of the problem shows us that conscious experience is just not the kind of thing that a wholly reductive account could succeed in explaining. Most modern philosophers take a materialist position, holding that reality is fundamentally physical, and that consciousness must ultimately be explainable in terms of the physical properties of the universe, whether it would be due to the material composition of nervous systems or the way the physical matter is functionally organized.

This view holds that consciousness is ultimately reducible to physical stuff and/or physical processes. Chalmers, however, begins by "taking consciousness seriously." He takes to task those who would reduce the hard problem of consciousness to the problem of behavior - what's detectable to an outside observer. The real problem of consciousness, what is difficult to explain, is consciousness from the inside - why we have conscious experience at all, why it seems like anything to be a conscious being. This phenomenal aspect of consciousness, the *qualia* of conscious experience, he contends, is the real mystery, and one not reducible to physics as we now conceive it.

The argument from "epistemic asymmetry" is perhaps the strongest argument against reductionism; it relates to Chalmers point about consciousness being a surprising feature of the universe.

There is a fundamental difference in the way that we know consciousness versus the way that we know anything else; we know our own consciousness directly, and we can never know the consciousness of another in that way. According to David Chalmers, there is an explanatory gap between physical processes and conscious experience. For explaining consciousness we need some extra ingredient. First, we will pay careful attention both to physical processing and to phenomenology and then find systematic regularities between the two.

Then we will explain the connection between the two in terms of a simple set of fundamental laws. In Chalmers' view, there are basic psychophysical principles that do not interfere with physical laws, but are a supplement to the physical theory. The new basic principles postulated by a non-reductive theory give us the extra ingredient that we need to build an explanatory bridge. Once we introduce fundamental psychophysical laws into our picture of nature, the explanatory gap has itself been explained. In this way we may eventually arrive at a truly satisfactory theory of conscious experience.

## CONCLUSION

David Chalmers has given two fanatical ideas that may have some promise. First one is consciousness is fundamental and the other is consciousness may be universal. In Chalmers view, consciousness cannot be reductively explained, but there can still be a theory of consciousness which is a non-reductive one. That is, we need to give up trying to explain the existence of consciousness wholly in terms of something more basic, and instead admit it as fundamental, giving an account of how it relates to everything else in the world.

Consciousness is a more uniform property of the universe, with very simple systems having very simple phenomenology, and complex systems having complex phenomenology.

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1. The basic idea behind explanatory gap is that we cannot fully account for subjective experience in terms of physical processes. There exists the necessity of 'filling the gap' between the physical phenomenon and its corresponding subjective experience.
  2. Philosophers in particular use the notion of "*qualia*" (singular "*quale*") to talk about phenomenal consciousness in its simplest, most basic form.
  3. The definition of zombie in philosophy is: A being that is externally indistinguishable from a normal human being but has no phenomenal consciousness whatsoever. A zombie is a non-conscious being, a creature or mechanism that has no stream of subjective life. Originally, the notion of zombie in philosophy was invented as a thought experiment to test our ideas about consciousness.

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